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Moral Wisdom and Good Lives by John Kekes. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1995. Pp. x and 237. $29.95 
W. JAY WOOD, Wheaton College 
Contemporary philosophers devote little attention to the very subject 
that the name of their discipline suggests would preoccupy them most-
wisdom. Perhaps their reluctance to tackle the subject stems from wide-
spread doubts about the religious and metaphysical worldviews in 
which accounts of wisdom are frequently embedded. Moral Wisdom and 
Good Lives, by John Kekes redresses this neglect by offering us an 
insightful, scholarly and, in the final analysis, flawed account of moral 
wisdom. By returning to classical Greek sources, Kekes develops a 
cumulative argument for an account of moral wisdom that is eudai-
monistic-centering on good lives for human beings; pluralistic-rec-
ognizing incompatible yet equally viable accounts of the good life and 
moral wisdom; secular- naturalistic in its metaphysics, and opposed 
to the idea of cosmic justice; individualistic-grounded in the individ-
ual's personal conception of a good life; and agonistic-realized only 
amidst struggle, much effort, and without guarantees of success. 
Agents are morally wise, on Kekes's view, if they have four key traits. 
First, they must have a reasonable conception of a good life. Second, they 
must have a suitably rich general knowledge of the goods and evils present 
in their own character and in the world in which character formation takes 
place. Self-knowledge of our enduring habits and behaviors is therefore 
indispensable to moral wisdom. Third, they must bring this general knowl-
edge of good and evil to bear on their evaluations of the real life situations 
in which they are forced to act. Finally, morally wise persons must exercise 
sound judgment in deciding how best to negotiate the morally difficult and 
complex situations life presents to our efforts to pursue the good life. 
While historical and cultural studies reveal a plurality of conceptions of 
the good life, Kekes nevertheless claims that not just any conception will do. 
"Moral wisdom requires that these conceptions should not merely seem 
good to us but that they should be genuinely good" (p. 12). Nature imposes 
certain invariable constraints on any conception of a good life. At a mini-
mum, any conception must acknowledge the necessity of our satisfying the 
"primary goods" that are unvarying among humans. But once require-
ments such as food, intellectual and psychological growth, and a stable 
social order are accounted for, there is room for tremendous variation 
among "secondary goods," such as friends, choice of profession, surround-
ings, long-term plans, and other factors contributing to a good life. For 
example, some persons may construe a good life as one dedicated to the 
polis and to social activism while others may contend that we achieve the 
best life through contemplation and monastic isolation. A part of moral wis-
dom consists in the "reciprocal adjustments" we make between our concep-
tion of a good life, and the secondary values made available by our tradi-
tions and circumstances. We make adjustments by "changing ourselves, by 
adjusting our conceptions of a good life and character to the world, rather 
than changing the world" (p. 209). We also make such adjustments by 
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learning to exercise control over our appetites and behavior so as to bring 
then into conformity with the good life as we construe it. 
But moral wisdom is not easy to cultivate, and significant obstacles of 
both internal and external sorts await those who put forth the effort. Kekes 
has a profound understanding of the barriers that routinely stymie and 
even defeat our growth in wisdom. Unlike Socrates, Kekes believes that not 
all attempts to grow in wisdom are guaranteed success, nor are those who 
achieve a measure of wisdom guaranteed happiness. Socrates, says Kekes, 
failed to appreciate the ways in which the adversities of contingency, con-
flict, and evil can thwart our pursuit of moral wisdom. Kekes devotes the 
bulk of his book to explaining these adversities along with the steps one can 
take to trv and overcome them. 
Conti~gency, conflict, and evil, though not insurmountable, constitute 
"permanent adversities," enduring features of the human condition. By con-
tingency, Kekes means our lack of control over the external and internal 
goods necessary for achieving our conceptions of a good life. External goods 
obtain when states of affairs in the world and the actions of others coincide 
with our pursuit of a good life. This does not always happen. Nature and 
society seem to conspire against our pursuit of the good life by overwhelm-
ing us with serious handicaps, disabling sickness, sub par or debilitated cog-
nitive, emotional and volitional capacities, and living conditions marked by 
strife, terror, and injustice. Conflict too poses a barrier to our pursuit of a 
good life. Not only does conflict in the form of disagreements about the good 
arise between people-reasonable people can devote themselves to God, 
their ethnic group, social activism, or the will to power-but we realize that 
each of us must select from among the genuine yet incompatible goods our 
circumstances make available to us. The problem is compounded, according 
to Kekes, because we lack any sort of method or standard by which to adju-
dicate between the different goods available to us, with the consequence that 
we regret the loss of goods we might have had but which were incompatible 
with the ones chosen. And if these barriers are not formidable enough, we 
also face our own evil. 'We often deliberately do not do what we know is 
good, and we also deliberately choose to do what we know is evil in prefer-
ence to what we know is good" (p.49). 
A chief task of morally wise persons, then, is to gain as much control as 
we can over the permanent adversities which threaten our realization of a 
good life as we conceive it. While complete control will always elude us, 
Kekes nevertheless believes that three kinds of reflection allow us to gain a 
measure of control. The first mode of reflection ingredient in wisdom, 
according to Kekes, is moral imagination, by which we enlarge our under-
standing of different desires and courses of action that are each compatible 
with our vision of a good life. Though adversity may frustrate some of our 
desires, our power to imagine alternative possibilities, to widen our visions 
of the good life, and to see other paths consistent with our vision of the 
good life, allows us to cope with momentary setbacks and get on with our 
quest. Through self-knowledge, the second important mode of reflection, 
we aim to understand the strengths and weaknesses of our own characters, 
and how we might transform their enduring patterns of desires, capacities, 
values, and motivations (interestingly Kekes omits beliefs from the list of 
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items comprising our character) so as to realize our conception of the good 
life. Self-knowledge, as Kekes depicts it, requires us to develop a coherent 
interpretation of the various aspects of our characters so as to make them 
consistent with our ideas of the good life. Once again, reality as well as per-
sistent unpleasant features of our own characters impose constraints on the 
interpretations we generate. Our point of view about ourselves must always 
be measured against the "human point of view." That point of view that "is 
necessarily shared by all normal and mature human beings. It is a point of 
view imposed on us by our nature, and so it is universally human, histori-
cally constant, and culturally invariant" (p. 138). 
To appreciate the third and final mode of reflection characteristic of 
moral wisdom, "moral depth," we must again consider the permanent 
adversities that Kekes believes obstruct our every effort to learn about and 
control our characters and the environments in which they take shape. 
Again these adversities are both internal and external. In our world the 
wicked often prosper; slumlords get rich, crooked businessmen and politi-
cians squirrel away fortunes in foreign banks with impunity, and oppres-
sors of widows and orphans lie down at night and sleep like babes .. And the 
morally virtuous, thinks Kekes, have no assurance that their pursuit of 
moral wisdom and a good life will meet with success. "Nothing we can do 
will alter permanent adversities. Once we have moral depth we know this 
to be the human condition .... But if we understand that conditions beyond 
our control endanger our aspiration to live good lives, then we can, to some 
extent, control our attitude toward this regrettable fact" (p. 174). "We recog-
nize that the good may suffer and the wicked may flourish, even in the long 
run, even when all things are considered .... [W]e do not believe in cosmic 
justice ... that there is a moral order in reality guaranteeing that lives of 
moral worth will be satisfying and that wicked lives will not be" (p. 183). 
"Contingency, conflict and evil may derail us no matter what we do" (p. 
217). And herein lies moral depth: that we take a realistic and mature atti-
tude toward adversity that allows us to continue struggling. Moral wisdom 
requires that we lose whatever innocence or illusions-here Kekes includes 
religious perspectives-that might cause us to ignore or downplay the 
extent of permanent adversities in our lives. 
But why should we not succumb to hopelessness? Why continue strug-
gling toward a life that may never come to fruition? Kekes's answer to this 
question prompts my first objection. He says we must adopt a tough-mind-
ed, hard-nosed realism about the world and its unrelenting obstacles to our 
happiness, and adjust our attitudes accordingly. "What is left is not much, 
but it is enough to fend off hopelessness" (p. 181). I disagree. Historically, 
most philosophers have sought motivation for the moral life in notions like 
a rationally ordered cosmos (the Stoics), or a supernatural source of good-
ness (Plato), if not in a Deity who is able to rectify this world's injustices 
(Kant). Kekes dismisses these moves, referring to them as "succumbing to 
the transcendental temptation," a move he labels "a false hope," "unrea-
sonable," and "futile." Yet he nowhere argues for their unreasonablness, 
nor the possibility that theism possesses superior resources to motivate the 
moral life. With Hume, Kekes believes that "fellow-feeling" is a natural sen-
timent arising in the human breast that evolutionary theory can probably 
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account for. Yet why should we not debunk this natural and widespread 
sentiment in much the way Freud discredits inclinations to believe in God 
generated by evolution? Kekes nowhere tells us why this natural sentiment 
should be indulged while these others should be suppressed. 
Few philosophers would deny that Kekes's four point scheme---a vision 
of the good life, knowledge of the world in which it is to be pursued, dis-
cerning evaluations of our circumstances, and sound judgment about how to 
act in such circumstances-identifies some of the essential elements of moral 
wisdom. And most will find illuminating, as I did, Kekes's insightful analy-
ses of Sophocles's tragedies as part of his broader discussion of ways our 
lives fall short of moral wisdom. The book is less illuminating-indeed it 
contains very little---in its positive suggestions for attaining moral wisdom. 
We are told, for example, that we must learn to control our "emotional 
excesses" and "correct our misguided emotional reactions" to the world. But 
how? What are emotions and how does one go about changing and correct-
ing them? Kekes offers no account of the emotions nor any specific strategies 
for reshaping them: an unfortunate omission given the centrality of manag-
ing the emotions for moral depth. Also, Kekes offers little in the way of logi-
cal analyses of the positive traits that comprise a good character. What is 
generosity, for example? What are its constitutive elements? What range of 
motives is proper to the virtue? What features distinguish generosity in one 
moral tradition from generosity in other traditions: e.g., Aristotelian generos-
ity, Stoic, Christian, or Confucian generosity? Kekes's account of moral wis-
dom doesn't provide a detailed analysis of the internal contours of the 
virtues and vices. Anyone looking for a map of moral wisdom that navigates 
between the different traditions will be left unsatisfied by this book. 
Were Kekes to inquire more deeply into the grammar of the virtues as 
conceived by Buddhists, Christians, Confucians, Nietzscheans, and other 
traditions, he might see that he overestimates the power of the universal 
"human point of view" and natural reason to ground an objective compo-
nent to moral wisdom and shape our visions of the good life. This is espe-
cially relevant for Kekes's account of justice, which he portrays as the 
human substitute for a missing divine justice, whereby we endeavor to 
ensure that people get what they deserve, "so as to decrease the naturally 
occurring gap between moral worth and satisfaction" (p. 202). But do our 
contrasting visions of the virtuous life offer sufficient common ground to 
make closing that gap a real prospect? 
Different forms of life not only offer different conceptual analyses of 
basic human goods, but even when they recognize the same basic goods, 
they often attribute different levels of importance to them. Our forms of life 
(Christian, Stoic, Aristotelian, liberat etc.) not only specify the virtues and 
vices needed for a successful and fulfilled life, but shape the meanings we 
impart to them. Gratitude is a Christian virtue but not an Aristotelian one. 
Nietzsche's Zarathustra condemns traditional accounts of virtue, especially 
Christian ones, as "lulling to sleep" and fostering "wretched contentment." 
Compassion is conceived of and pursued differently by Stoics and 
Christians. As a consequence, different traditions conceive of moral wis-
dom in different and at times incompatible ways. A Nietzschean bent on 
pursuit of the will to power might grant the indispensability of "primary 
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goods" for the good life, yet insist that the social order that best promotes 
them is totalitarian. Stoics in pursuit of apatheia tend to depreciate the need 
for the physical, psychological, and social goods Kekes sees as essential to 
any reasonable account of the good life. They also insist that the emotions 
and virtues prized in a Christian conception of wisdom ought to be sup-
pressed. In short, the "human point of view," as Kekes calls it, does not 
offer a sufficiently objective content to stave off radically incommensurable 
accounts of moral wisdom and justice. The differences among different 
virtue traditions jeopardize the prospects for agreement and cooperation 
that Kekes's account of justice requires. 
I found Kekes's book melancholy, at times even grim in its tone, taking 
on some of the coloration of the Greek tragedies from which he draws so 
many lessons. "The fact remains," he writes "that permanent adversities 
may ruin a life no matter how much moral wisdom the person living it has" 
(p. 223). And when these forces overwhelm us and others we care about, we 
are supposed to draw comfort from knowing that we did what we could to 
resist them. Our misforhme is "just the accident of having stumbled into the 
path of the blind, impersonal, indifferent juggernaut of the natural world" 
(p. 223). Kekes's book provides a clear contrast to Christian and other reli-
gious accounts of moral wisdom, and for that reason contributes important-
ly to what I hope is a growing literature on the subject. 
Due to a typesetting error in our July 1998 issue, the fol/owing review was not included 
in its entirety. The complete review follows below. The Editors sincerely regret the error. 
God, Knowledge & Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology, by Peter van 
Inwagen. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995. Pp. 284. $17.95. 
FRANCES & DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER, Western Washington 
University & Seattle Pacific University 
This volume collects nine essays published by Peter van Inwagen 
between 1977 and 1995. Part I features, among other things, modal skep-
ticism with respect to ontological arguments and arguments from evil. 
Part II addresses certain tensions Christians may feel between modern 
biology, critical studies of the New Testament, and the comparative 
study of religions, on the one hand, and Christian orthodoxy, on the 
other. Part III deploys a formal logic of relative identity to model the 
internal consistency of the orthodox doctrines of the Trinity and the 
Incarnation. In what follows, we summarize and reflect on five essays.' 
"Ontological Arguments" focuses on valid arguments by that name 
which claim or imply that a necessary, concrete being is possible. But how 
are we to tell whether necessary existence (N) is compatible with concrete-
ness (C)? Conceptual analysis won't do, says van Inwagen; for, firstly, the 
compatibility of Nand C is not a conceptual matter and, secondly, even if 
it were, analysis would help no more than it would help settle whether 
'7777' appears in the decimal expansion of re. Perhaps we should beheve N 
is compatible with C anyway, since the possibility is not conceptually pre-
